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Neither ‘Public’ Nor ‘Private’, ‘National’ nor
‘International’:
Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal
Pluralist Perspective
Peer Zumbansen*

I. INTRODUCTION
Much of today’s writing on ‘global governance’ presumes a fundamental gap between the
domestic forms, institutions and instruments of legal regulation on the one hand and what is
perceived as a dramatic regulatory void on the global scale on the other. This anxiety is
particularly accentuated with regard to border‐crossing, global corporate activity, which is seen
as having over time successfully escaped the reach of traditional, nation state‐based forms of
regulation. As the literature on the challenges of regulating the conduct of multinational
business corporations [MNCs] has been growing exponentially, the contention remains,
however, whether or not an answer to this alleged exhaustion of the regulatory state in the fact
of global corporate (mis‐)conduct is likely to be found in the extension of the regulatory grasp of
the nation state – or of international state bodies – in a kind of ‘expanded jurisdiction’ sense. By
contrast, what appears to emerge from a continuing, rich assessment by lawyers1, political
scientists2 and economists3 with the corporate, labour law and human rights dimensions of
*

Professor of Law. Canada Research Chair in Transnational Economic Governance and Legal Theory. Director,
Critical Research Laboratory, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 2009‐2010 Visiting Professor,
University College Dublin, School of Law. Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. I am grateful for comments from
Fabrizio Cafaggi, Martin Böhmer, and Jacco Bomhoff and the participants of the Transnational Private Regulation
Conference in Dublin, June 2010. Financial assistance from the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law
and from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant # 864‐2007‐0265] is gratefully
acknowledged.
1

Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2007); see already
Detlev F. Vagts, 'The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law' (1969) 83 Harvard Law
Review 739.
2

John Ruggie, 'Business and Human Rights: Further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect
and remedy” framework. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises' (2010) A/HRC/14/27
http://baseswiki.org/w/images/en/0/04/2010_Advance_Edited_Report.pdf.

3

John H. Dunning and Sarianna M. Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 2nd ed. (Edward
Elgar, 2008).
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MNC is a growing awareness of the need to approach the problem from what has fruitfully
been referred to as a ‘regulatory governance’ perspective.4 From this vantage point the
challenge presents itself no longer as one of law’s limits (or as the ‘end of the state’), but as
one, which is foremost concerned with the way in which law operates, is created and enforced
in the global arena. And from this perspective, then, we can begin to take into view the actually
existing forms of corporate regulation. In other words, a theory of norm creation in the context
of global market activities might not be found through a mere extension or translation of nation
state based doctrine onto a rudimentarily defined sphere ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ the nation state.
What is needed, instead, is a theory that allows for a reflection on the manifold ways in which
norms have been emerging in the space between what we refer to as the ‘domestic’ on the one
hand and the ‘global’ on the other. As shall be elaborated in the following, for a legal theory of
global regulation, ‘space’ is not meant to depict a geographical realm, but instead a
methodological one in which the meanings – and, limitations – of our distinction between the
‘national’ and the ‘global’ can be addressed.
Such a reflection must incorporate a high degree of empirical evidence of existing forms of self‐
regulation such as codes of conduct, of recommendations, ‘social norms’5 or ‘governing
contracts’6, but it must do so against the background of a theoretical investigation into the
concept of law, which underlies and informs the almost habitual, routine distinction between
‘law’ on the one hand and these myriad forms of ‘alternative forms of regulation’ on the other.
The lawyer (as any other scientist) cannot simply ‘go out and see’, but must account for the
conceptual bias with which this confrontation with ‘reality’ occurs. In this process, the study of
the fast‐proliferating forms of public‐private, hybrid norms that apply to market activity, turns
into a self‐reflection on the theoretical starting points of the larger legal theory from the
vantage point of which this incorporation of empirical evidence takes place.7 It is, thus, not
simply an option to build a theory on, say, the ‘fact’ of ubiquitous forms of market self‐
regulation, but instead a necessary reflection on how one or more existing theories of how legal
norms are in fact incorporate and account for this particular empirical evidence.
The core contention of this paper is that the challenging nature of the regulation of global
corporate conduct requires an adequately differentiated approach towards the identification
and analysis of the norms in question. The central question, which will be addressed is: “What
is the concept of law that underlies the regulation of global corporate conduct?” I will try to
4

Colin Scott, 'Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism' (2010) EUI Working Papers Robert
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Private Regulation Series‐02 http://ucd.

5

Lisa Bernstein, 'Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry' (1992)
21 Journal of Legal Studies 115
6

See the contributions to the Symposium: ‘Governing Contracts: Public and Private Perspectives’ (2007) 14 Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 183‐483.
7

Stewart Macaulay, 'Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas of Ian Macneil
and Lisa Bernstein' (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 775; Gregory Shaffer and Victoria Nourse,
'Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Order Prompt A New Legal Theory?' (2009) 61 Cornell Law
Review 61
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suggest an answer by proceeding in three steps. First, I will take issue with the frequently found
contention that global corporate conduct is, in view of the alleged inability or, exhaustion of
states to effectively ‘intervene’, foremost a matter of self‐regulating markets. This part of our
discussion will require a scrutiny of what lawyers seem to mean when they refer to the market.
In a second step, I will argue that an exemplary area such as corporate governance can best be
understood as an instance of what I call transnational legal pluralism, that is as a field that
becomes visible through a particular methodological lens, which revisits the longstanding legal
sociological analysis of norm creation in the transnational arena. In order to illustrate this
approach, the following section will provide a brief introduction into the place and relevance of
corporate governance codes in the present evolution of this regulatory area. A particular
emphasis will here be placed on the particular nature and dynamics of overlapping forms of
state and non‐state, hard and soft regulation. In conclusion, the last section will suggest how
the lessons of such a case study can contribute to an ongoing theoretical investigation into the
nature of global regulatory governance.

II. MARKETS AND STATES AS REFERENCE POINTS IN THE REGULATION DEBATE
A. THE ‘DEATH OF THE STATE BY GLOBALISATION’‐THESIS
Even if we were to accept recommendations to let markets govern themselves because the
nature of global capitalism allegedly meant an end for unilateral, autonomous national
Keynesian economic policies8, this would still not jive with the general contention that
globalisation enslaves, dis‐empowers and overwhelms states – as an agent in itself. What is
wrong with this picture is the juxtaposition of the state and globalisation as two quasi‐actors
who are involved in a struggle over regulatory authority, ending with globalization getting the
upper hand. What is right, if anything about this claim, however, is that this perspective has
been extremely pervasive in the context of dramatic changes in the way that states have been
operating over the last decades, a transformation that has – again and again – been associated
with the expansion of globalisation. At the basis of such contentions of the ‘death’ or the
‘retreat’ of the state are, above, all accounts of how particular regulatory approaches, which
have their origin in state‐based models of legal and political regulation, are no longer adequate
to govern activities that are seen to dramatically transcend the jurisdictional and authoritative
scope of state competence. The welfare state’s regulatory ‘crisis’ of the 1970s in the face of an
exponentially grown budget, the oil price shock and the growing awareness of the state’s limits
in designing adequately sophisticated policy programmes for a highly differentiated, pluralist
society9 finds itself exacerbated in the nation state’s crisis in an era of globalisation.10
8
9

Thomas L Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (Random House, 2000)

Jürgen Habermas, 'The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies
[1985]' in J Habermas (ed) The New Conservatism Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate [ed and transl by
Shierry Weber Nicholsen] (MIT Press, 1989)
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By contrast, at least two accounts of rich evidence of what states actually ‘do’, challenge this
perception in a fundamental way. On the one hand, there are by now a great number of
pertinent accounts related to the changes in administrative governance within the nation state
that illustrate a far‐reaching transformation of the state in a plethora of regulatory fields. The
ongoing investigations among administrative and constitutional lawyers, political scientists,
sociologists and regulatory theorists give ample evidence of how the state has long been
increasingly involved in complex collaborations, delegations, trade‐offs, and myriad other
divisions of labour with civil society or, ‘market’ actors.11 At the same time, there is a rich
repository of studies related to the creation and nature of norms in the context of market self‐
regulation, that point not to the end of the state, but rather suggest a highly complex
relationship between state and non‐state actors in the production and administration of these
norms.12
As a result, the picture of law’s limits or, even, exhaustion with regard to global market begins
to lose its sharp contours. What we see is not the futile struggle of nation states playing a
regulatory and policy catch‐up game with de‐territorialised corporate and commercial actors or
other amorphous crystallizations of globalization forces. Instead, an image begins to form of a
rising number of actors with the capacity to expand indeed on a vast territorial and operational
scale. At the same time, we witness an intricate overlapping of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ norms, which
are being produced by both state and non‐state actors in the regulation of these activities. The
state, far from being a victim of larger globalisation forces, is instead deeply involved in the
production and administration of the norms that govern the global market place13, even if he is
by far not the sole author of governing regulations.14

10

See the critical discussion by Fritz W. Scharpf, 'The viability of advanced welfare states in the international
economy: vulnerabilities and options' (2000) 7 Journal of European Public Policy 190.
11

See eg Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, 'Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns of Governance in Britain'
(2003) 81 Public Administration 41; Richard J. Stillman II, 'Twenty‐First Century United States Governance:
Statecraft and the Peculiar Governing Paradox it Perpetuates' (2003) 81 Public Administration 19; Robert Elgie,
'Governance Traditions and Narratives in Public Sector Reform in Contemporary France' (2003) 81 Public
Administration 141; Martin Loughlin, 'The Functionalist Style in Public Law' (2005) 55 UTLJ 361

12

Lisa Bernstein, 'Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms'
(1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765; Gillian Hadfield, 'The Public and the Private in the
Provision of Law for Global Services' in V Gessner (ed) Contractual Certainty in International Trade Empirical
Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic Exchanges (Hart Publishing, 2009);
for a discussion, see eg Gralf‐Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of
Transnational Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2010), ch. 2.
13

See eg Saskia Sassen, 'The State and Globalization' in JS Nye and JD Donahue (eds), Governance in a Globalizing
World (Brookings Institution, 2000).

14

Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, 'The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System' in
RB Hall and TJ Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge University
Press, 2002); A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global
Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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This constellation invites analysis from a host of perspectives, and the intriguing emphasis
placed by legal scholars in the recent past on the importance of ‘regulation’ and ‘governance’ is
an important and crucial element in this regard.15 It is becoming increasingly clear that a legal
theory of these forms of regulation ‘within’ and ‘beyond’ the nation state cannot be adequately
developed from within, but must instead take into account how existing forms of regulation
testify to an intricate overlap of different forms and concepts of regulation. The impressive rise
in importance of new institutional economics in the idea competition over ‘governance’ is of
eminent importance in this regard.16 As a result, ‘economic governance’17 has developed into a
sophisticated regulatory theory that must be taken seriously by anyone interested in the
evolution of regulatory governance – which certainly should include lawyers.18 As this short
paper cannot do justice to the rich and wide‐ranging exchanges between lawyers and
economists on the respective boundaries and overlaps between their fields already under
way19, I will suggest to focus, instead, on the one concept that occupies a crucial and yet
strangely undefined place in this interaction, the market. The general contention that there is a
choice between state ‘intervention’ and ‘self‐regulating markets’ regularly operates with
seemingly self‐explanatory concepts of each. As we have seen with regard to the ‘state’ and its
presumed demise in the face of globalization, this can easily be very misleading. Against the
background of an extensive critique of the alleged neutral nature of quasi‐natural markets20, we
15

Colin Scott, 'Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State' in J Jordana and D Levi‐
Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Edward Elgar,
2004); Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation. Texts and Materials (Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
16

See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press,
1990), and Oliver E. Williamson, 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead' (2000) 38 Journal
of Economic Literature 595.
17

Oliver E. Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance' (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1.

18

Peer Zumbansen and Gralf‐Peter Calliess, 'Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and
Interdisciplinary Perspectives' in P Zumbansen and G‐P Calliess (eds), Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory
(Edward Elgar, 2010)

19

For the area of international law, see the vivid disputes around the concept of customary law: Jack Goldsmith
and Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (Harvard University Press, 2005), Andrew T. Guzman, How
International Law Works. A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press, 2008), and Oona A. Hathaway and
Ariel N. Lavinbuk, 'Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law' (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1404, Paul
Schiff Berman, 'Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law: Jack L. Goldsmith/Eric A. Posner, The Limits of
International Law' (2006) 84 Texas Law Review 1265; for the area of corporate law, see eg Gillian K. Hadfield and
Eric Talley, 'On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law' (2006) 22 Journal of Law, Economics &
Organization 414, and Peer Zumbansen, 'Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic
Turn of Reflexive Law' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 769.
20

Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non‐Coercive State' (1923) 38 Political Science
Quarterly 470; Morris R. Cohen, 'Property and Sovereignty' (1927) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8; Kerry Rittich,
'Functionalism and Formalism: Their latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates'
(2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 853.
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shall in the following section briefly revisit Karl Polanyi’s depiction of market disembeddedness
as a crucial step in the analysis of economic regulation, before looking more closely at the
changing perceptions of the state in this context.

B. MARKETS AND THEIR GLOBAL DISEMBEDDEDNESS
1. Society as an Adjunct to the Market
In his famous chapters on “Societies and Economic Systems” and the “Evolution of the Market
Pattern”, which we today refer to for the concept of the embeddedness of the market, the
political economist Karl Polanyi writes:
“Though the institution of the market was fairly common since the later Stone Age, its
role was no more than incidental to economic life.”21
A little later, he remarks that:
“The outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that
man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. […] Neither the
process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific economic interests
attached to the possession of goods; but every single step in that process is geared to a
number of social interests which eventually will be very different in a small hunting or
fishing community than those in a vast despotic society, but in either case the economic
system will be run on non‐economic motives.”22
As is well known, this chapter (4) concludes in the elaboration of the three famous market‐
structuring and market–organising principles: “reciprocity” (related to family and kinship), “re‐
distribution” (the central collection and dissemination of production – “… these functions of an
economic system proper are completely absorbed by the intensively vivid experiences which
offer superabundant non‐economic motivation for every act performed in the frame of the
social system as a whole.” (p. 48)), and “householding” (oeconomia), which precedes the rising
levels of division of labour, as well as the role of money and credit. Building on this taxonomy in
Chapter 5, entitled “Evolution of the Market Pattern”, Polanyi famously notes that:
“the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to
the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an

21

Karl Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Beacon Press,
1944)), p. 43; this passage is later complemented – in the same chapter – by his remarks about “man as a social
being” (ibid., p. 46): “His natural endowments reappear with a remarkable constancy in societies of all times and
places; and the necessary preconditions of the survival of human society appear to be immutably the same.”
22

Polanyi, note 1 supra, p. 46.
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adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social
relations are embedded in the economic system.”23
It is here, where, as under a magnifying glass, we not only find the kernel of the critique of
capitalism unfolding in the latter half of the Twentieth century, which has returned onto our
agenda with the greatest urgency today,24 but also a powerful illustration of the differentiation
concept of contemporary modern sociology, most strikingly, the thesis of the hegemony of the
economic system in a functionally‐differentiated society.25 Polanyi writes:
“The vital importance of the economic factor to the existence of society precludes any
other result. For once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based
on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a
manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the
meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in market
society.”26
A little further on, follows a devastatingly prophetic observation of competitive markets:
“With every step that the state took to rid the market of particularist restrictions, of
tolls and prohibitions, it imperiled the organized system of production and distribution
which was now threatened by unregulated competition and the intrusion of the
interloper who ‘scooped’ the market but offered no guarantee of permanency.”27
2. The Exaggerated News of the Death of the State
At the beginning of the Twenty‐first century and in midst of a dramatic financial and economic
crisis, can it be important – and even beneficial ‐ to rely on Polanyi to help us think through the
challenges of end‐of‐history market regulation? Can his observations offer analytical tools for
an adequate explanation of contemporary markets? In this paper, I suggest that while Polanyi’s
analysis of market disembeddedness remains a central pillar in our continuing assessment of
the meaning of market regulation, we are well advised to complement his analysis by a further
inquiry into the transformation of regulatory actors and instruments that are pertinent in this
field. Such an inquiry, however, must go beyond a mere contemplation as to which degree
23

Polanyi, note 1 supra, p. 57.

24

See, for example, J.Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New
International (Routledge, 1994)); R. Richard Rorty, Das kommunistische Manifest 150 Jahre danach (Suhrkamp,
1998)).
25

N. Niklas Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 1988)).

26

Ibid.

27

Polanyi, supra, p. 66.
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lawyers ought to take insights from sociologists and political scientists into account when they
are designing supposedly more ‘effective’ or ‘better’ forms of regulation, as pursued – for
example – by the European Commission.28 I suggest that such an inquiry must be above all a
methodological one, meaning that it must take seriously the competition among different
regulatory approaches, above all law and economics – not ‘law & economics’.
My argument has two parts and in the first focuses on – and rejects – the much alleged ‘loss of
state sovereignty and regulatory exhaustion’ perception that underlies many of the crisis policy
arguments today. The second step of the argument is concerned with the competition between
law and alternative approaches to regulation, most prominently captured today, on the part of
lawyers, by references to ‘soft’ law, codes of conduct, ‘governance through disclosure’ or ‘social
norms’ and, on the part of in particular New Institutional Economics, by the distinction between
‘informal’ and ‘formal’ modes of regulation.
As concerns the first step of my argument: it starts from a perceived loss in confidence among
lawyers with regard to their ability to provide for adequate regulatory tools. It posits in
particular that a legal theoretical analysis of the changing forms of regulation in this area can
carve out promising perspectives on the distinct role of law and legal regulation in what has
become a highly diversified and multi‐layered regulatory landscape, where in fact law is no
longer supreme. Such a perspective, I suggest, could be a promising response to the perception
prevailing today that the only way to address the tremendous economic, financial and social
fall‐out of the current crisis would be a ‘return of the state’. The Achilles heel of this approach is
its misrepresentation of the role played by the state and its sweeping attempts over the last
thirty years to enhance the global competitiveness of national firms through the facilitation of a
wide‐ranging network of self‐regulating norm clusters in corporate and commercial law as well
as in securities regulation. As has been aptly analysed, the past three decades, usually counted
from the enthronement of Thatcher and Reagan29, have seen less a retreat, demise or death of
the state, than a fundamental transformation in the way that the state has been involved in the
global proliferation of market regulation.30 Images of ‘more’ state now in contrast to an alleged
‘less’ or, weaker or retreated state yesterday are misleadingly suggesting a choice of quantity,
rather than quality. As becomes strikingly obvious in the analysis of the evolving forms of
regulation in the named fields, the role of the state, far from diminishing, has instead changed
from the primary or exclusive author of binding norms (and, of course, this depiction is itself
28

http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm

29

Ronald Dore, William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan, 'Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century' (1999) 15
Oxford Review of Economic Policy (Oxford Rev Econ Pol'y) 102; Ronald Dore, 'Financialization of the Global
Economy' (2008) 17 Industrial and Corporate Change 1097.
30

David Levi‐Faur, 'The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism' (2005) 598 The Annals of The American Academy
of Political and Social Science 12; Julia Black and David Rouch, 'The development of global markets as rule‐makers:
engagement and legitimacy' (2008) Law and Financial Markets Review 218; Gralf‐Peter Calliess, 'Transnational Civil
Regimes: Economic Globalization and the Evolution of Commercial Law' in V Gessner (ed) Contractual Certainty in
International Trade Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic
Exchanges (Hart Publishing, 2009)
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untenable and overstated31) to being one among other highly influential actors involved in the
collaborative, experimental, direct and indirect production of norms relevant to particular areas
of market activity.32 It is against this background, that our analysis has to strive for a better
understanding of the changing form of the state33 while at the same time challenge the
frequently found perception that the state is in fact the only legitimate and competent law‐
making authority. Such a shift in perspective is mandatory in order to take into the view the
myriad forms that the state has for the longest time been involved in a permanent
transformation of sovereignty in various directions. The state’s entanglement in the far‐
reaching regulation of markets, the provision of subsidies (including large‐scale ‘bail‐outs’ as in
present times) and institutional guarantees in areas such as health, education, security or
infrastructure are only some of the domestic illustrations of this fact34, while the state’s
engagement with other states, governments, supra‐national organisations, INGOs and global
civil society actors illustrates another, more ‘outward’‐oriented relativisation of state
sovereignty.35
The following observations are limited to what can at best be a cursory study of the
institutional and conceptual dimensions of a particular form of market regulation illustrated by
the example of corporate governance codes. Such an investigation offers a host of insights into
the particular way in which market regulation has been evolving in a framework that cannot be
adequately depicted as either national or international, public or private. Instead, the particular
relation between state and non‐state actors in the initiation and execution of the norm‐
creation process and the ensuing implementation, dissemination and administration of the
norms in question defy categorisations through which we would like to neatly assign the
authority for such a particular regulatory regime to one side or the other. The chosen field,
corporate governance, is a case in point in the study of transnational law making, as I will try to
argue by scrutinizing both the underlying meaning of transnational and the concept of law
informing this approach. I will argue, that areas such as corporate governance regulation must
31

Harry W. Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England
(University of Toronto Press, 1988)
32

See for an insightful discussion: Colin Scott, 'Regulating Everything' (2008) Inaugural Lecture, University College
Dublin, School of Law, 2622008 http://geary.ucd.ie/mapping/images/Documents/RegEverything.pdf.
33

See hereto also Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor, Rethinking Governance. The Centrality of the State in
Modern Society (Cambridge University Press, 2009)

34

Michael Stolleis, 'Die Entstehung des Interventionsstaates und das öffentliche Recht' (1989) 11 ZNR 129; but see
as well the rich analysis in the context of the ‚Varieties of Capitalism’‐School: Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds),
Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001);
Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura (eds), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism in Germany and Japan (Cornell
Studies in Political Economy, Cornell University Press, 2001).
35

Mary Kaldor, 'The Idea of Global Civil Society' (2003) 79 International Affairs 583; Saskia Sassen, 'The State and
Globalization' in JS Nye and JD Donahue (eds), Governance in a Globalizing World (Brookings Institution, 2000)
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today be understood as instances of “global assemblages”,36 or, from a legal theoretical
viewpoint, as examples of transnational legal pluralism.37 As such, a regulatory field such as
corporate governance is, on the one hand, neither exclusively national (domestic) nor
international, while, on the other, this does not imply the elimination or the overcoming of the
nation state.38 In addition, such an area does not jive with the public/private distinction as
applied to the nature of the norm‐creating actor that is so central to our learned ways of
assigning law‐making authority.39 Instead, these assemblages, in their description through
Saskia Sassen, are constituted through persistent local activity and interpretation, and are ‐ as
such ‐ comprised of human, institutional and technological elements, the latter resulting pre‐
dominantly from the breathtaking advances in information technology (“digitalisations”).40 In
contrasting the concept of transnational legal pluralism with that of Sassen’s global
assemblages, I will suggest that, despite the convincing account of the changed and yet crucial
relationship between the national and the global spheres, which Sassen presents, there is a
continuing need for a specifically legal perspective on the re‐configuration of “spaces and
places” which is so powerfully shaping human activity and policies. It is this emphasis on the
legal theoretical re‐construction of both Polanyi’s theme of embeddedness and of Sassen’s
metaphor of assemblages that holds considerable promise for rendering a timely concept of
transnational markets. In order to carve out such a distinctly legal theoretical perspective, it is
necessary to place the existing assessments of the relationship between the state and the
market into a larger discursive context, namely that of global governance, for it is here that we
can find important stimuli for a renewed reflection on the emerging role of law in a concert of
competing regulatory theories.

36

For this concept, see S. Sassen, Territory ‐ Authority ‐ Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages, (Princeton
NJ‐Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006); for earlier elaborations, see idem, The Global City, (Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991), and idem, Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of
People and Money, (New York: The New Press, 1998); see, also, M. Amstutz & V. Karavas, “Weltrecht: Ein
Derridasches Monster”, in: G.‐P. Calliess, A. Fischer‐Lescano, D. Wielsch & P. Zumbansen, (eds), Soziologische
Jurisprudenz. Liber Amicorum für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin‐New York: Walter de Gruyter,
2009), pp. 647‐674.
37

P. Zumbansen, “‘New Governance’ in European Corporate Governance Regulation as Transnational Legal
Pluralism”, (2008) 15 European Law Journal, pp. 246‐276, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145; P.
Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, forthcoming in (2010) 1:2 Transnational Legal Theory, available as CLPE
Research Paper 01/2010, at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542907
38

Sassen, 2006, note 8 supra, p. 325.

39

Carol Harlow, '"Public" and "Private" Law: Definition without Distinction' (1980) 43 Modern Law Review 241

40

Sassen, 2006, note 8 supra, p. 349 (noting the importance of focusing on financial centres, not “markets”, “as
key nested communities enabling the construction and functioning of such cultures of interpretation”.
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III. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM
A. THE AMBIVALENCE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The wide‐ranging discourses around ‘global governance’ offer an important opportunity to gain
new and further insights into the building blocks of an emerging legal, political and economic
order. The struggle with the absence of ‘world government’ is undeniably a struggle ‐ over the
form and legitimacy of – any – government itself. As such, current inquiries into the role of the
state and the nature of legal regulation are charged with the translation of an extremely rich
repository of rights critique, ‘law and society’ scholarship, ‘law and economics’ analysis, and
legal anthropology into the discourses unfolding under the umbrella of an interdisciplinary
study of transnational regulatory regimes. Such a research agenda develops against the
background of the ‘anti‐positivist’ origins of legal pluralism41, which eventually evolved into a
highly differentiated and empirically driven analysis of co‐existing and overlapping regulatory
regimes.42 The emergence of ‘governance studies’43 and the increasingly influential study of law
through a regulatory lens44 testify to an important widening and deepening of the legal
analytical apparatus. Seen in this light, the present obsession with the alleged novelty of a
‘global’ legal and political order has direct ties to preceding contestations of welfare state
governments and their aftermaths in the last two decades, including a significant
functionalisation of regulatory policies and legal principles.45 Accordingly, much needed
inquiries into previous experiences with rights regimes are fuelled by grave concerns over
democratic representation46 but remain torn between references to state‐to‐state relations
41

Richard Ashby Wilson, 'Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational Law' in M
Goodale and SE Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 345.
42

Sally Engle Merry, 'Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes' (1992) 21 Annual Review of Anthropology
357; Sally Engle Merry, 'New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law' (2006) 31 Law & Social
Inquiry 975; Gregory Shaffer and Victoria Nourse, 'Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Order Prompt
A New Legal Theory?' (2009) 61 Cornell Law Review 61.
43

See eg, Scott Burris, Michael Kempa and Clifford Shearing, 'Changes in Governance: A Cross‐Disciplinary Review
of Current Scholarship' (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 1.

44

Colin Scott, 'Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State' in J Jordana and D Levi‐
Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Edward Elgar,
2004); Colin Scott, 'Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism' (2010) EUI Working Papers
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Private Regulation Series‐02 http://ucd; see also Bronwen Morgan
and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation. Texts and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
45

Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought'
(2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342; Peer Zumbansen, 'Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism
and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 769.
46

David Held, 'Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective' (2004) 39
Government and Opposition 364; David Held, 'Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!' in D

2010]

NEITHER PUBLIC NOR PRIVATE, NATIONAL NOR TRANSNATIONAL

15

and a concern with global ‘citizens’47, as well as over the politics of (domestic) hard and (global)
soft laws48 and the nature of rights49 on a global scale.50 Finally, the competing assertions of
market regulation, before and since the unfolding of the current global financial and economic
crisis51, call for a renewed assessment of the legal nature of markets, long ago scrutinized by
Legal Realist scholars52 as well as of the particular forms of legal and non‐legal regulation that
remain at the centre of ‘law and society’53 scholarship and studies of ‘legal pluralism’.54 It is
being increasingly recognized that such inquiry cannot remain confined to a discipline or field
on its own: branches of economics as well as a wide range of ‘social sciences’ have been called
upon to contribute to the emergence of a more layered and more differentiated concept of
‘regulatory governance’55, of which the field of corporate governance is a most telling
illustration.
Held and A McGrew (eds), Globalization Theory Approaches and Controversies (Polity, 2007); Regina Kreide, 'The
Ambivalence of Juridification. On Legitimate Governance in the International Context' (2009) 2 Global Justice:
Theory Practice Rhetoric 18.
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For an insightful discussion, see Rainer Forst, 'Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice' in T Pogge (ed)
Global Justice (Blackwell Publishing, 2001).
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Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, 'In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics' in W Mattli
and N Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, 'The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies' in W Brown and J Halley
(eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique (Duke University Press, 2002); see also Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive?
(2005 Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press, 2006), in particular ch. 3. Still a very insightful critique is
provided by Crawford Brough Macpherson, 'The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice' (1987) in: Macpherson, The Rise
and Fall of Economic Justice, and other Essays The role of state, class and property in twentieth‐century democracy
1, in particular ch. 2: ‘Problems of Human Rights in the Late Twentieth Century’.
50

Sundhya Pahuja, 'Rights as Regulation: The Integration of Development and Human Rights' in B Morgan (ed) The
Intersection of Rights and Regulation (Ashgate, 2008); Fleur E. Johns, 'Global Governance: An Heretical History
Play' (2004) 4 Global Jurist Advances Art. 3 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=603232), 11, 29, 37: ‘The space of global
governance, as described in these writings [referencing work by John Coffee Jr., Richard Falk, Anne‐Marie
Slaughter and others, PZ], is a realm aspiring to be one of coherence and predestination. It is a space in which
earthly divisions are to melt away before the final judgment of the market or the universal decrees of human
rights. In this domain, the actions of governments, corporations, laborers, employers, even refugees are fused into
pre‐inscribed patterns of convergence.’ See also Joseph Raz, 'Human Rights in the Emerging World Order' (2010) 1
Transnational Legal Theory 31.
51

See eg, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall. America, Free Markets and the Sinking of the World Economy (W.W. Norton &
Co., 2010), and Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Financial Capitalism (Edizioni Casagrande, 2010).
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Hale and Cohen, supra, note 20.
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Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Coming of Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club' (2005) Annual Review of Law
and Social Sciences 1.
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Sally Engle Merry, 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869; Harry W. Arthurs, Without the Law:
Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (University of Toronto Press, 1988);
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Melissaris’ Ubiquitous Law)’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 573‐584.
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Oliver E Williamson, The Economics of Governance, Nobel Prize Lecture 2009, available at:
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/williamson‐lecture.html; see also Oliver E.
Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance' (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1; Colin Scott, 'Regulatory
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B. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY LANDSCAPES
Corporate governance has to be seen in the context of a highly diversified series of
transnational norm‐setting processes resulting in a veritable explosion of corporate governance
codes in Europe and elsewhere. With the proliferation of corporate governance codes,
influenced and pushed by international56 and transnational activities of norm setting, discussion
and thought exchange57, it has become increasingly difficult to identify a single institution or
author of a set of norms. Instead, much of the production and dissemination of corporate
governance rules operates through the migration of standards58 and a cross‐fertilisation of
norms. A distinct feature of this de‐territorialised production of norms is the radical challenge
these processes pose for our understanding of what we call law proper. The dissemination of
corporate governance codes, disclosure standards and rules, best practices and codes of
conduct, affects the entire juridical ‘nexus of corporate governance’ as comprised of norms
pertaining to company law, labour law and securities regulation59, as the decentralisation of
norm producers is repeated, mirrored and reflected in the hybridisation of the norms
themselves. It is in this sense, that the study of the proliferation of corporate governance codes
and company law production in general and of the rules of remuneration disclosure in
particular feeds into a broader research inquiry into the changing face of legal regulation in
globally integrated marketplaces.
Against this background, corporate governance emerges today as a product of the fundamental
transformations of regulatory instruments and institutions. As corporate law is being shaped by
a complex mixture of public, private, state‐ and non‐state‐based norms, principles and rules,
generated, disseminated and monitored by a diverse set of actors, a closer look at this field can
serve two purposes, both of which this paper briefly addresses: one is the way in which the
analysis of contemporary corporate governance regulation can help us to assess the emerging,
new framework within which corporate governance, but also other rules of market regulation
are evolving. Secondly, through the way in which we begin to understand this emerging
Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism' (2010) EUI Working Papers Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies, Private Regulation Series‐02 http://ucd; Peer Zumbansen and Gralf‐Peter Calliess, 'Law,
Economics and Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary Perspectives' in P Zumbansen and G‐P
Calliess (eds), Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory (Edward Elgar, 2010).
56
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57
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58

See for a comparable analysis of migrating human rights standards, Craig Scott and Robert Wai, 'Transnational
Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential of Transnational
"Private" Litigation' in C Joerges, I‐J Sand and G Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism
(Hart Publishing, 2004).
59

See John W. Cioffi, Public Law and Private Power: Corporate Governance Reform in the United States and
Germany in an Age of Finance Capitalism (forthcoming) (Cornell University Press, 2010).
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transnational regulatory framework as an illustration of contemporary rule‐making, the long‐
standing legal pluralist contention of formal and informal legal orders comes to be seen in a
new light. In light of, on the one hand, early legal‐sociological work by Ehrlich (“living law”) and
Gurvitch (“social law”), this leads us to re‐visit the core question of any sociology of law,
namely, how “to investigate the correlations between law and other spheres of culture”.60
Expanding the spectrum, on the other hand, with a view to the legal pluralist work of scholars
such as Moore (“semi‐autonomous field”), Galanter, Macaulay, Sousa Santos or Teubner,
contemporary assessments of “hybrid legal spaces” (Schiff Berman) ‐ not sufficiently captured
with references to local or national contexts ‐ might help us better understand the distinctly
transnational emergence of regulatory regimes. The transnational lens allows us to study such
regimes not as being entirely detached from national political and legal orders, but as emerging
out of them, and reaching beyond them. The transnational dimension of the new actors and the
newly emerging forms of norms radicalises their semi‐autonomous nature, represented in the
tension between a ‘formal’ law and policy making apparatus on the one hand and the
spontaneously evolving ‘informal’ norms in particular social contexts on the other61, in the
following way: regulatory spaces are marked by a dynamic and often problematically‐
instrumentalised tension between formal and informal norm‐making processes. The way in
which evolving governance regimes can fast adapt to the challenges that arise from national
political economies, leads to an exacerbation of the above‐described tension without our being
able to yet adequately depict or theorize these dynamics. The regulatory ‘failure’ of traditional,
state‐based legal‐political intervention into multinational corporations today62 has long served
as an illustration of the need to develop either distinctly “post‐national”, institutionalised
governance forms, or self‐regulatory, soft instruments of voluntary binding. While, to the
public’s disbelief and to lawyers’ own professional frustration, the proposed approaches,
ranging from “global jurisdiction”, “torture as tort”, transnational civil human rights litigation,
and scandalisation movements including global shaming, to soft law instruments, self‐binding
norms, codes of conduct and best practices, have so far not been able to solve this riddle, they
have at the same time underscored the need to fundamentally adapt the analytics of both
norm‐generation and enforcement.63
60

E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, (orig. published in German as Grundlegung der
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This prompts a scrutiny of the position of corporate law within a larger, highly differentiated
and dynamic regulatory environment. Corporate law unfolds in a web of norms, official and
unofficial, public and private, from which it receives impulses and to which it sends others, and
this web is transnational in both origin and reach.64 From a traditional perspective, it is marked
by a combination, a complementarity and complex intersection of domestic and international
regulations. By contrast, however, transnational law (TL), as coined by Philip Jessup in 1956,65 is
marked by its unruly structure of public, private, domestic and international norms, produced
by official and unofficial norm‐entrepreneurs, which opens an altogether distinct perspective
on the distinction between ‘national’ and ‘international’. Emphasizing the need to theorize the
foundations of this distinction, connected Jessup’s project to legal sociological work on the co‐
existence of a plurality of legal orders. However well the underlying promise of such a shift in
perspective was appreciated at the time, Jessup’s proposal did contain an important message
for the majority of mainstream lawyers, for whom legal pluralism had always been something
exotic and of interest only for those in law with a particular inter‐disciplinary interest in legal
sociology, anthropology or regulatory theory. Jessup aimed to take a possible concept of
transnational law seriously by suggesting to study the intriguing parallels between different
conflicts of interest that arise both domestically and internationally. Of paradigmatic
importance here was his example of shareholder democracy at home and democratic
participation (and legitimacy) in international economic organisations. By highlighting the
inherent parallels between the two regulatory fields, which in application of the
national/international distinction had been studied in isolation from each other, Jessup was
able to point to a need to adequately address the parallels as a regulatory constellation
unfolding in one, not two realms of legal imagination. To the degree that lawyers increasingly
knew more about the regulatory challenges that law‐makers and judges were facing in different
jurisdictions and in which these observers and comparative lawyers also began to see that
transactions with border‐crossing substance or consequences required a legal response which
was adequate to the nature of this transaction, which was neither domestic nor international,
transnational law came more and more into focus.66
To build upon, but also to move beyond, Jessup, in order to realise transnational law’s potential
as a tool for the study of the transnational governance regime of corporate governance, we
need to remember that TL can first be understood as a field of law‐making. From this
perspective, TL can capture the dramatic proliferation of law‐making actors and locations
(institutional dimension), and the changing nature of legal norms, as corporate behaviour is
64
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now being shaped by both public and private, official and unofficial, mandated and self‐enacted
norms (normative dimension). From this perspective, the proliferation of corporate law‐making
actors and institutions, and the resulting hybrid norms, can serve as an illustration for other
fields with high political currency, given the interests involved in its development. Secondly, and
more importantly, however, is the idea of transnational law as method.67 The focus of the
methodology adopted here is inspired by Jessup’s suggestion that we should think of a law that
is neither public nor private international law, but one that captures the mixed – institutional
and normative – nature of the regulatory regimes.
As will be shown in more detail in the following section, corporate governance codes provide a
telling example of this transformation of traditional state‐originating, official norm‐setting in
favour of increasingly de‐centralised, spatialised processes of norm production.68 The very
nature of these codes themselves has been changing dramatically as a result of this new form
of transnational embeddedness. Central to the observation in this particular area that this
paper focuses on is the particular nature of the regulation of business conduct and corporations
in globally interdependent activity spheres (marketisation), fundamentally changing national
political economies (privatisation), and a dramatic expansion of issue‐driven, functionalist
regulatory regimes (scientisation).69 This constellation, however, suggests nothing less than a
fundamental contestation and erosion of boundaries between state and non‐state actors,
official and unofficial law, public and private ordering.70 Politics matter still, but they are no
longer so easily defined as the politics of “The Right” or “The Left”, which we learned to
distinguish domestically throughout the Twentieth century and right up to the recent shock to
the financialised global economy. The questions that are raised not only by the commercial,
productive, but also the re‐distributive, sustainable, R&D related and routine/innovation‐
related activities of corporations do not lend themselves to straight‐forward categorisations of
either public or private, or of domestic or international. In response to this situation,
transnational law as method suggests an assessment of the emerging regulatory framework
while keeping the political questions and issues that continue to arise around particular
67
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Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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regulatory challenges or experiences in view. The importance of transnational law as method
stems from the observation that we must re‐think law and regulation without resorting to
traditional distinctions in the belief that they will deliver the same explanatory potential that
we have grown accustomed to: instead, we must approach the emerging institutional
framework from a transnational regulatory perspective. And it is here that comparative
corporate law transforms itself into the study of these increasingly de‐territorialised corporate
governance regimes as an illustration of transnational legal pluralism.

IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES
The development of corporate governance codes can be seen as an example of intricate,
domestic and transnational, multi‐level processes of norm generation and norm enforcement.
Starting from mere factual evidence, the emergence of corporate governance codes in recent
years has begun to fundamentally alter the legal landscape of corporate law.71 Despite their
recognition as an essential element of corporate law72, these codes constitute a particular
challenge to other, statutory approaches to law making, as they regularly are drafted by non‐
state actors such as non‐governmental associations, private industry institutes or corporate
actors.73 In general, corporate governance codes are relatively short collections of, on the one
hand, legal regulations that are already in force in a particular jurisdiction, and
recommendations and suggestions, directed either to private corporations or, in some cases74,
the law maker, concerning a company’s organisation, its governance rules and disclosure
regime not included in statutory law, on the other.75 In the case of the German Corporate
Governance Code, for example, recommendations are marked by the word “shall”. While
Companies are free to deviate from them, they are under an obligation to disclose this
71
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deviation.76 By contrast, suggestions can be deviated from without disclosure.77 We shall see
below how the German legislator has chosen to transpose this disclosure obligation into
statutory law. These hybrid norms of corporate regulation78, which are neither exclusively
public nor private, pose a formidable challenge to traditional thinking about law making
authority, non‐legal rules and their enforcement. The following section will explore the
different dimensions of corporate governance codes by providing first a general introduction to
the regulatory issues dealt with under the heading of corporate governance before studying the
emergence, legal nature and the enforcement of such codes in greater detail.

A. WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
The law of corporate governance is one of the fastest developing areas in law making in recent
years, and discussions about ‘good corporate governance’ have for years now been surpassing
the confines of academia, occupying media and public debates. In other words, “Good
corporate governance is a top priority in business worldwide.”79 Alongside wide‐ranging public
protest against managers’ self‐dealing and excessive pay‐packages, institutional investors have
for years now been moving into the center of corporate governance rule making by developing
investor protection standards.80 Surely by the summer of 2002, when then‐President Bush
heralded “Corporate Responsibility” in the aftermath of the Enron scandals81, corporate
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governance regulation had come to rank high on national and transnational policy agendas.82
With other countries learning about their own corpses in the closet83, the high intensity level of
policy proposals, domestic and transnational law making initiatives has been no less than
astounding.84 The world wide academic and policy discussion of corporate governance,
embedded in numerous debates in‐ and outside of specially empanelled expert commissions,
hearings and documented by government and working group reports, symposia, articles and
voluminous books, had been accompanying an active production of norms on the national and
the international level.85 Issues of general, even public, concern include managers’ alleged free‐
reigning authority to dispose of corporate assets as they see fit, the steep amounts of executive
compensation packages86 and the seemingly untamed and untamable power of corporate
actors were part of sweeping policy programmes to make companies and thereby respective

82

See, THE ECONOMIST, 13 July 2002: American capitalism takes a beating; Margaret Blair, 'Post‐Enron Reflections
on Comparative Corporate Governance' (2002) <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=316663>, 2‐3:
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infrastructure sectors that were leading U.S. economic expansion in the 1990s, and the Enron fiasco and
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http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020503psa.htm (25 September 2009).
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others (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance. The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford University
Press, 1998); Joseph A. McCahery and others (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity
(Oxford University Press, 2002), and Klaus J. Hopt and others (eds), Corporate Governance in Context. Corporations,
States and Markets in Europe, Japan and the US (Oxford University Press, 2005); see the concise overviews of the
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See the scathing critique by Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance. The Unfulfilled
Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004); see hereto William W. Bratton, 'The
Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation' (2005) 93 California Law Review 1557; the scope of
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national economies more globally competitive.87 Such transformations did not, however, occur
in a vacuum. Instead, the questions central to the global debate over the convergence or
divergence of corporate governance standards touched upon long‐standing governance,
control, legitimacy and accountability concepts characterising the large business corporation as
it had been regulated in the context of distinct regulatory cultures.88 The literature on these
concepts is legacy and has been experiencing an exponential growth in the last years.89 For the
purpose of this paper, I shall only very briefly mention a number of central elements in the
heightened debate over corporate governance standards before focusing more closely on the
specific transnational dimension of corporate governance codes and their place in the evolving
framework of corporate law making.
Corporate governance relates to the exercise of powers inside the firm: the analytical focus can,
for one, be directed to the relationship between the owner (shareholder; principal) and the
management (agent). Alternatively, one may focus on the overall organisational structure of
the firm. While this also includes the principal‐agent ties, it also encompasses the other
‘stakeholders’ in the firm, such as employees and creditors. The first, control‐oriented approach
centres on shareholders as the prime residual claimants of the firm: therefore, the firm’s
organisation is governed by the overriding principle of maximizing ‘shareholder value’.90 The
other, stakeholder oriented, approach considers the actors in and around the firm and its
business with regard to their vested interests in the firm. It sees the firm as embedded in a
specific legal, economic and political culture, herein playing a role as societal actor.91 In contrast
to the shareholder approach, this perspective takes into account the public services rendered
by a large firm in view of employment capacities and overall socio‐economic spin‐off.92

87
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Capitalism (forthcoming).
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Sanford Jacoby, 'Corporate Governance and Society' (2005) 48 Challenge 69.
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These two definitions lie at the base of a debate over different patterns of corporate
organisation, which was for the longest time driven by an almost overwhelming belief in what
some recognized as nothing less than the ‘end of history in corporate law’93, namely the
eventual triumph of the shareholder value theory. The present crisis has done its part in
seriously undermining this credo. However, it is important to emphasize that what might be
perceived as having been a dispute merely among corporate law scholars (and policy makers),
had instead long become a forum of much wider impact, as participants acknowledged the
exemplary role of corporate governance for a timely and much needed scrutiny and critique of
market regulation.94

B. THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY AND GLOBAL CORPORATE REGULATORY REFORM
While this dimension of the corporate governance over convergence or divergence cannot be
pursued in this paper95, it continues to form an important background for an assessment of the
role of corporate governance in a larger context of market regulation. As the following section
should make clear, this assessment has more and more become one of transgressing national
boundaries. Drawing on the observation, for example, by the eminent U.S.‐American corporate
law scholar Melvin Eisenberg of the four ‘essential modules’ of corporate law, which he
identifies as state statutory law, state judge‐made law, federal law and private ordering
through soft law,96 it becomes apparent that we can no longer limit our perspectives to either
traditional (hard‐law oriented) or exclusively national processes of rule creation. Instead, rules
and standards as developed and disseminated by transnational actors such as MNC, stock
exchanges whose listing rules are of overriding importance for domestic and foreign
companies, or International Organisations such as the OECD must be seen to form an integral
part of the transnational law of corporate governance.97
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Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law
Journal 439.
94
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Corporate governance codes such as those developed in countries around the world98
illuminate the significant characteristics of law making processes that have been undergoing
dramatic changes with regard to the actors involved and the nature of the norms generated in
these processes. These developments have to be placed into the wider context of law making
reform. In this respect, reform does not only concern company law but, more generally involves
national, European and international attempts to improve law making procedures by allowing
for a wider inclusion of private actors in rule making procedures.99 What is involved from the
point of view of democratic theory, is a tension that has long been growing between a
functionally reduced, rubberstamping parliament on the one hand and a fast moving, hardly
controllable administration which is in close contact and interaction with private actors, on the
other.100 At the same time, the currently widespread attempts at improving respective national
laws on corporate governance and firm organisation101 must be seen against the background of
an allegedly overwhelming pressure of international convergence towards a set of corporate
governance principles, most notably established in the US and the UK102, an effort that was for
98
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years informed by a sense of urgency with regard to adapting stakeholder‐oriented, closely
knit, bank‐financed corporate governance systems to an extremely volatile competition for
globally available investments and is now, at the time of this writing, shaped anew by
widespread concerns with the consequences and externalities of the finance capitalism of the
last twenty years. As comparative corporate governance scholars continue to be busied with
assessments of the post‐reform prospects of central building blocks of the different regulatory
architectures such as the two‐tier system of supervisory and management board103 in German
corporate governance, employee representation104 and the role of banks105, we can recently
discern a distinct reorientation in focus. On the one hand, there can be no doubt that the
intermittently lively interest in comparative corporate governance, convergence or divergence
and the alleged triumph of shareholder primacy has given way to a considerably more sober
look at how we arrived in the present crisis. A new excellent study on the comparative
evolution of U.S. and German corporate governance frames its conceptual orientation as well
as the concluding analysis firmly in the context of the present financial crisis.106 This sensitivity
to timeliness, however, is anything but coincidental. Instead, it is owed to the ‘financialisation’
of the corporation and the far‐reaching overtaking of corporate law by corporate finance
concepts, that has marked the last twenty years of corporate governance reform, which seem
103

See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, 'Corporate Governance und deutsche Universalbanken' in D Feddersen, P Hommelhoff
and UH Schneider (eds), Corporate Governance Optimierung der Unternehmensführung und der
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(Aufsichtsrat): A German View on Corporate Governance' in KJ Hopt and E Wymeersch (eds), Comparative
Corporate Governance Essays and Materials (Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 10, 17 f.; Peter O. Mülbert, 'Bank Equity
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others (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford University
Press, 1998), 362, 364 ff., discussing the claim that the supervisory board had traditionally been weakened in order
to refrain employees’ influence within the firm.
104

Thomas Raiser, 'The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany' (1988) 36 American Journal
of Comparative Law 111, 114; Katharina Pistor, 'Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance
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and others (eds), German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (Springer, 2007).
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to have been firmly steeped in the belief of adapting the business corporation to the dynamics
of global capital markets.107 To be sure, this reform orientation can be read as one possible
reaction to the deep‐running transformation of Western welfare states, to the erosion of social
security and the breaking‐up of embedded, long‐grown business‐finance networks that shaped,
for example, the stunning success of ‘Germany Inc.’ At the same time, however, the
financialisation of the global economy and the rise of shareholder value as the dominant
paradigm in corporate governance marked a distinct adoption of a narrow and reductionist
conception of the firm. As we are now witnessing a global introspection into the causes of the
crisis, there is an important opportunity to revisit the recent trajectory of corporate governance
reform in light of the dire consequences of the exuberrant subjection of the business
corporation to the insatiable appetite of capital markets.108 The promising prospects of the
current crisis are the emerging opportunities to see beyond singular stories of outrageous,
scandalous conduct in order to take into view the connections between pursued policies and
market outcomes. As John Braithwaite noted recently, “The ritual for blaming someone for
failures that are system failures is ritualistic in the sense that it seeks to calm critics by giving
them a fall guy to chew on instead of fixing the problem.”109
These connections can no longer solely be studied within contained, embedded systems of
national political economies. Instead, there is a growing awareness of the fact that the
adaptations of historically evolved governance systems display a particular transnational
dimension. In light of the globally intertwined business and interaction among firms created
under different legal rules, corporate governance rules have increasingly become a competitive
asset on a ‘law market’110, a market, however, that is not only constituted by sovereign sellers
with vested authority in the creation of binding legal norms, but by an amalgamation of
national governments, supranational norm setting institutions such as the OECD or the UN
Global Compact as well as a private parties such as multinational corporations and interest
group representations. This particularly global regulatory landscape has not failed to capture
the imagination of scholars of comparative law111, regulatory theory112 and institutional
analysis.113 So, while the current crisis must rightly be perceived as a failure of regulation and
107
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state action114, it can no longer be denied that reactions to the crisis, including the calls for
‘tougher regulation’ as recently promulgated by political leaders around the world, will unfold
in a tightly intervowen space of governmental collaboration and interaction.115 In the field of
corporate governance the landscape is not only populated by national governments eagerly
engaged in a headstrong pursuit of regulatory reform; complementing such efforts is a vast
proliferation of private and mixed public/private, hybrid processes of rule making cutting across
jurisdictional boundaries and contributing to an increasingly densely woven net of guidelines,
best practices, and standards. The defining feature of the emerging transnational body of
corporate governance norms is the intricate resurfacing of a series of paradoxes pertaining to
the
inseparability
of
substantive/procedural,
coordinative/regulatory
and
authority/affectedness aspects of the norms in question. In order to illustrate the theoretical
challenge facing any legal theory that wishes to explain the norm creation dynamics in this area,
our analysis cannot be confined to the substantive law governing specific forms of societal
activity, which has long remained the hallmark of comparative work in the law of corporate
governance116; rather, our attention has to turn as well to the dynamics that are unfolding
between different levels and sites of rule making from a regulatory perspective. From this
combined perspective, the law of corporate governance becomes a prime example of a
transnational law regime. The intricate embeddedness of regulatory innovation in locally
defined governance structures on the one hand, and their integration in transnationally
unfolding rule making processes is characteristic of the current regulatory landscape in
corporate governance, as illustrated by the particular dynamics of corporate governance codes.
From this perspective, codes are a powerful example of the way in which private ordering
maintains an intricately challenging tension with the institutional frameworks for official law
making.

C. LAW MAKING IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE EXAMPLE OF THE GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE
On June 21, 2002, the German chamber of federal states („Länder”), the Bundesrat, approved
of a bill which had prior to that passed the national parliament („Bundestag”), and which
introduced a number of substantial changes to the German Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation
Act].117 This particular statute had to a large degree been contemplated and prepared under
114
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the auspices of two specially formed governmental commissions concerned with a reform of
German corporate governance. The second of these commissions, the so‐called ‘Corporate
Governance Code‐Commission’, had been convened with the mandate of taking up the
suggestions of the first commission, central to which was the drafting of a voluntary Code of
Corporate Governance Rules. This second commission was chaired by Mr Gerhard Cromme,
Spokesman of the supervisory’s board of German steel manufacturer ThyssenKrupp,118 who
presented its work on 26 February 2002 to the Ministry of Justice.119
Among the many interesting features of the German Corporate Governance Code, which a
renowned German corporate governance scholar coined a ‘novum’ in the system of German
legal sources120, is its intricate and still largely unresolved legal nature.121 The following section
will approach a possible answer to this question in the larger context of corporate governance
reform as it has been pursued on the domestic, European and transnational levels on the one
hand and of a distinctly legal sociological perspective under the proposed heading of
‘transnational legal pluralism’, on the other.122
Ever since the time of its publication in 2002, the German Corporate Governance Code has
prompted a vivid debate about its legal or, perhaps, non‐legal nature, with assessments ranging
from ‘soft law’123 to ‘unconstitutional’.124 That this debate has still not subsided125 might be
explained in light of the particular novelty that the arrival of the idea of a code constituted in
Germany.126 At the same time, its creation could be seen as having been partaking in a
comprehensive presentation of the TraPuG’s main elements by Heribert Hirte, Das Transparenz‐ und
Publizitätsgesetz (Beck, 2003).
118
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worldwide surge of the drafting and promulgating of corporate governance codes.127, but also
the Code’s rather straight‐forward normative design. The Code itself includes those norms and
regulations that are mandatory corporate law rules which are already set out in the German
Stock Corporation Law. The Code’s purpose, according to its Drafters, in reiterating these norms
here is to provide foreign investors with a transparent and simple introduction to central rules
pertinent to the corporate governance rules existing in Germany.128 Furthermore, the Code
includes recommendations, which are expressed by the word “sollen” (shall) and the
observation of which is to be made transparent in an annual statement made by the firm’s
management.129 Lastly, the Code contains suggestions as to corporate conduct the observation
of which is merely ‘suggested’ but there is no obligation to disclose whether a company has
followed these suggestions.130 The ‚comply or disclose’ principle which is endorsed in the Code
with regard to “recommendations” has been seen as an indirect enforceability anchor in the
Code, whereby it could be seen to lose its genuinely voluntary character.131 That the Code in
fact attains an at least indirect mandatory character, is strengthened by the enactment of
Section 161 in the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), whereby the legislature actually
introduced the disclosure duty into codified law.132 But, does this suffice to make the Code a
piece of enforceable legislation? Others have argued, that even if there is a disclosure
obligation with regard to the company’s compliance with the Code’s recommendations, it
127

See eg Axel von Werder, 'Preamble to the Commentary on the German Corporate Governance Code, 3rd ed.' in
H‐M Ringleb and others (eds), Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex Kodex‐Kommentar (3rd
ed) (CH Beck, 2008), who situates the creation of the German Code within the larger context of a veritable
‘international code movement’, id. at 14. See also the list of corporate governance codes listed on the website of
the European Corporate Governance Institute (http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php)
128

German
Corporate
Governance
Code,
Foreword,
http://www.corporate‐governance‐
code.de/eng/kodex/1.html: “This German Corporate Governance Code (the "Code") presents essential statutory
regulations for the management and supervision (governance) of German listed companies and contains
internationally and nationally recognized standards for good and responsible governance. The Code aims at
making the German Corporate Governance system transparent and understandable. Its purpose is to promote the
trust of international and national investors, customers, employees and the general public in the management and
supervision of listed German stock corporations.”
129

See the German Corporate Governance Code, Preface, 2, available at http://www.corporate‐governance‐
code.de/index‐e.html.
130

Id.

131

Wolfgang Seidel, 'Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex ‐ eine private oder doch eine staatliche
Regelung?' (2004) 25 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 285; Wolfgang Seidel, 'Kodex ohne Rechtsgrundlage'
(2004) Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 1095; Markus Heintzen, 'Der Deutsche Corporate Governance
Kodex aus der Sicht des deutschen Verfassungsrechts' (2004) 25 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 1933
132

See, supra. The quality and assessment of this obligatory annual ‘explanation’ must certainly be disputed, see,
e.g., Martin Peltzer, 'Handlungsbedarf in Sachen Corporate Governance' (2002) Neue Zeitschrift für
Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 593, 594; regrettably, the just published, leading commentary on German stock
corporation law, by Uwe hüffer, remains silent on this new codification, see Uwe Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (5. Aufl. edn
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would be wrong to perceive the Code itself as ‘law’. The latter, so it was argued133, would only
then be the case, if the recommendations themselves were being made obligatory which,
arguably, they are not.134 These opposed viewpoints illustrate the underlying central difficulty:
It is clear, that the Code’s practical relevance is to be seen in its effect on the actual behaviour
of firms135, something which appears to have constinuously accrued with each passing year.136
Whether or not firms do comply with the code’s dispositions relating, eg, to transparency and
disclosure of executive compensation137 (a part of the Kodex that spurred concrete legislative
action leading up to the entering into force of a federal statute on the adequacy of executive
compensation in August 2009138), the publication of the firm’s reports on the Internet139, or the
facilitating of personal exercise of shareholders’ voting rights140 will, according to the rules
established by the Code, remain within the discretion of the company.141 Again, the Code
explicitly foresees that companies do not have to comply with ‘recommendations’. And yet they
are obliged – under Section 161 AktG – to issue an annual explanation whether or not they did
comply.142 The annual monitoring of the Code’s ‘acceptance’ has revealed consistently growing
numbers of German major corporations to observe the Code.143
A systematic interpretation alone of the Code’s three‐fold structure with information,
recommendations and suggestions, which would aim at determining the legal nature of each of
the Code’s components in concert with the others and, lastly, within the general structure of
the Code, does not appear to yield a clear‐cut result. While the merely informative sections on
133

Henrik‐Michael Ringleb, Introduction, in: Henrik‐Michael Ringleb and others, Kommentar zum Deutschen
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Seibt, 'Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und Entsprechenserklärung (§ 161 AktG‐E)' (2002) 47 Die
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the one hand and the suggestions on the other can remain outside the gambit of such a line of
inquiry, the Code’s recommendations invite further inspection. The mentioned disclosure
obligation is in itself intriguing, if not problematic144: While identifying criminal sanctions
against the disclosing director in the case of an incorrect declaration (Section 400 AktG), neither
the Statute nor the Code contains any means of how such incorrectness should be ascertained.
This can be interpreted as meaning that the legislator could not wish to or did not imagine how
to put in place a tight monitoring system that goes beyond the registration of whether the
declaration has been made at all, the failure of which is sanctioned in the Handelsgesetzbuch
(HGB ‐ Commercial Code). What is likely, then, is that the legislator, keeping in line with the
regulatory spirit of the Code itself, did in turn aim at inducing an indirect enforcement
mechanism into the law, the functionality of which, however, is unfolding entirely outside of
the statutory realm. Where companies would fail to correctly disclose their compliance or non‐
compliance, so it might be argued, the market, that is the investors, will adequately act on this
communication. Surely, such a perspective is not without problems: even if in theory the
market were to react to an incorrectly or not at all issued declaration by devaluing the
company’s shares, there would still remain considerable burden of proof challenges to establish
liability.145 Rejecting as well a number of other legal grounds for liability due to the legal – non‐
binding – nature of the Code146, the effect of Section 161 would merely be the initiation of a
shaming process, playing out on a market for reputation. From this perspective, however, it
remains doubtful, how the Stock Corporation Act, a statutory public norm, which commands a
private actor, here a stock corporation, to annually disclose whether it has complied with a non‐
binding set of recommendations, can be compatible with an enforcement processs through
shaming, which unfolds outside of the state.
But, perhaps, this perspective is inadequate to capture the particular combination of
coordinative/regulatory dimensions reflected in the Code. The preceding discussion suggests
how our conceptualisation of the enforcement qualities of the Corporate Governance Code is
informed by our understanding of the distinction between a statutory norm of law set by the
state on the one hand and a non‐binding norm of non‐law on the other. The linkage between
law and non‐law as it is being established by Section 161 leads us to further entrench this
unquestioned distinction where, perhaps, we should recognise that it was an inappropriate one
to begin with. Whether or not the Code is law, might not be answerable with regard to its
enforcement mechanism, but perhaps better with view to its authorship. It is here, where the
relevance of the above proposed RCRC model to depict such incremental ways of rule making
becomes central. We will lay this out in detail in the following section.
144
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1. Who – Really – Makes Company Law?
If the answer whether or not a norm is to be recognised as law, depends on the authoritative
process to enact legal norms, then a closer look must be taken at the process through which
the Corporate Governance Code was enacted. Under German constitutional law, the right to
initiate legislative proposals lies with the government and with the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat, the federal parliament and the representation of the Federal states respectively.147
This in fact was the starting observation of those scholars who are opposed to any norm‐
making by private expert groups. These scholars identified instances where a government seeks
societal approval for envisioned legislative projects from private interest groups as examples of
an on‐going and proliferating ‘deparlamentarisation’.148 Their critique was directed, in
particular, against the norm‐production by societal groups such as expert groups, commissions
or associations the work of which is at times based on an ambivalent forms of public
authorisation.149
This skepticism, however, appears overdrawn, by many accounts. First of all, it has long been
recognised by adminstrative and constitutional law scholars, that the state is highly dependent
on the expert input from societal actors in carrying out its legislative and administrative
functions.150 Furthermore, it is clear that with the growing complexity of societal relations and,
correspondingly, a growing demand for sophisticated and context‐sensitive public governance
forms151, any form of norm‐production and implementation has become an extremely fragile
process of risk‐taking and of trial‐and‐error. In the light of the particular governance challenges
arising in contemporary, complex societies152, an allegedly clear‐cut distinction between public
and private governance schemes, built on the image of a sovereign, knowlegdable state
presiding over a fragmented, market‐society, would fail to grasp the intricate forms of public‐
147
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private governance mechanisms, of knowledge sharing and experimental politics that
characterise contemporary law making.153 In this light, the insistence on the state keeping a
safe distance from private knowledge, bears little explanatory value for our understanding of
contemporary forms of governance.
The second strand of critique mounted against corporate governance codes and the associated
form of private law making targeted the real effect emanating from such codes and practices.
Given the already alluded‐to complex regulatory nature of the Code, it is not surprising that it
met with severe critique regarding its purportedly absent legislative authoritarial basis.154 While
some expressed their support of this form of installing a forum in order to solicit dispersed and
urgently needed expertise, feeding into concrete law making proposals for the Federal
legislature,155 others pointed to various drawbacks of this particular form of law making.156 One
of the main contentions concerned the alleged ‘exclusion’ of the parliament from the actual
process of conceptualizing and preparing of the legislative proposal.157 In this respect, it was
153
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alleged that the soliciting of experts into the open parliamentary arena would make the law’s
genesis more transparent and, ultimately, render it more legitimate.158 Another critical issue
concerned the fundamental question whether or not a private body of experts is or should in
fact be entitled and authorised to draw up binding law.159
This critique mounted against ‚private’ law making bodies such as the two recent government
commissions on corporate governance is not so easily refuted. The core issue appears to be
whether or not privately enacted norms may be given binding effect towards third parties to
the norm generation. While an intuitive answer would suggest a clear “no”, the matter at stake
here does indeed escape such a straight‐forward assessment. While it is a common place in
private law that contractual obligations concern foremost and only the contracting parties160,
we have been witnessing a decisive evolutionary development in the public (constitutional)
governance of private contract law towards a recognition of the larger social role played by
private transactions.161 Indeed, it is a frequent element of private law arrangements, that
contracts between two (or more) parties have effects upon third parties to the contractual
agreement.162 And yet, the here suggested connection between contractual ‘private ordering’
and the norm setting by commissions might, however, be misleading. As we have seen, it is not
158

Id.
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entirely clear, whether or not the commissions are in fact ‘private’ by nature. This can be
doubted at least in those cases where government officials are participating in the
commission’s work, such as was the case in the first Commission of 2000‐2001.163 While the
Code commission164 was made up only of private actors, ie representatives of large firms or
academic institutions, the Commission’s personnel might also not entirely provide the answer
to the question as to whether any of these commissions is furnished with the proper
competence to enact binding law. More importantly, then, is the nature of the Commission’s
empanneling. Where the Commission is convened upon the initiative and request by the
government, there is indeed considerable reason to qualify it to be more ‘public’ in nature than
if it were upon the initiative of a commercial actor, such as a bank or another private interest
group.165
After the preceding discussion, we are likely to still feel unsatisfied with an ultimately
inconclusive attempt at answering the question regarding the Code’s legal nature with regard
to the constitution of the drafting Commission. The result, however, we suggest, was entirely
predictable if not inevitable, given the starting premises. If anything, this discussion has begun
to illustrate the inadequacy of the public/private distinction to capture what we have in
Chapter 2 referred to as the paradoxical constitution of transnational law making. In the
following section, we will further explain the inadequacy of the attempt to explain the legal
nature of the Code through a designation of its norms or its authors as either public or private.
2. Corporate Law Making Between State and Society
The discussion of the rise of governance in contemporary law making reflects a wide‐ranging
interest, but also a high level of concern with what is being perceived as a ‘privatisation of
law’.166 As Colin Scott recently noted: “…recognition of private legislation reflects both a desire
to better understand the diffuse nature of capacities underpinning regulatory and wider
governance practices and a concern respecting the legitimacy of such non‐governmental rule
163
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making.”167 This combination of ‘desire’ and ‘concern’ originates from a persisting association
of law and its creation with the public, state sphere, while informal and private ordering
remains relegated to the private, market realm. Central to our analysis up to this point was an
argument against this dualistic distinction, which is inadequate to grasp the ways in which both
hybrid and private forms of norm generation can produce norms with regulatory functions. In
concluding this section on corporate governance codes, it is time to draw out the context in
which this hybrid law making occurs, a context which is both ‘real’, that is consisting of actors,
and conceptual, meaning that it at the same time a particular, methdological reflection on the
way that norms are being created in such areas today.

D. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE INTRICACIES OF ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE
The example of the German Corporate Governance Code illustrates this particular approach,
which Gralf Calliess and I have been conceptualizing as Rough Consensus and Running Code
[RCRC]168, in the following way. The German government, facing immense domestic and
international pressure to reform its corporate law regime so as to make German companies
more attractive for global investors, was aware of the reform obstacles existing in the
contemporary German political economy. At the same time, the government was well aware of
the potential of societal (‘market’) self‐regulation, as was declared by the Ministry of Justice at
the occasion of being presented with the Commission’s Corporate Governance Code in
February 2002. Furthermore, the German government was hardly taking a revolutionary step
when inviting a Commission to draft this instrument. Even if the legislative project of drafting a
national civil code in the latter part of the nineteenth century was of course in many ways
different to the drafting of the Corporate Governance Code in 2002, the Schröder government’s
initiation of the Commission, which was markedly referred to as a ‘Government Commission’,
also bears some important resemblances to its historical forerunner. In both instances, the
government drew on private expert knowledge in preparing a comprehensive legislative
instrument, the regulatory impact of which was perceived as being so large that its delegation
to a commission of experts promised to channel otherwise conflicting and perhaps irresolvable
positions through a discursive, outcome‐oriented process. Certainly, the government’s initiation
of this norm‐generation process remained ambivalent at best with regard to the legal nature of
the Code growing out of the commission’s work. The striking characteristic of both the process
of the Code’s drafting and of the Code itself remains, it seems, its hybrid nature between a non‐
binding, voluntary, ‘private’ regulatory instrument on the one hand and a document, linked to a
statutory disclosure obligation by a federal law, on the other. Yet, neither dimension
adequately depicts the dynamics that shape the emergence of the idea of a Code, the evolution
of its drafting, the intriguingly open‐ended nature of the discussion around the legal nature of
both the norms of the Code as of the Code itself. Instead, the discussion has made it clear that
167
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the repeated attempts to solve this mystery by effectively avoiding the question ‘public’ or
‘private’ through designating the Code as hybrid and by referring to its norms as ‘soft law’,
achieves just that, namely to avoid the underlying conundrum of how to integrate such
governance processes into our legal theoretical methodology and doctrine. This, then, makes
the example of the German Corporate Governance Code particularly intriguing because its
coming into being is reflective of both its embeddedness in a complex, historically evolved
political economy that was historically skeptical with regard to private law making and market
ordering169 and a fast‐evolving transnational regulatory landscape in which public and private
actors – as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ not only compete in striving to make ‘better rules’ but in a
much richer fashion overlap, intertwine, collaborate and antagonize, thereby contributing to a
constantly changing space that Saskia Sassen has referred to as both institutional and
normative.
The concept of Rough Consensus and Running Code seeks to capture the particular tension
between multipolar, formal/informal processes of deliberation and consensus‐seeking on the
one hand and the emergence of regulatory instruments with experimental and adaptable
character on the other. Central to this approach is the emphasis on the inseparability of
elementary features in theories of social order, which are traditionally defined through
distinctions. Examples include, foremost, the distinction between public and private or between
state and market, but also – as regards the ‘function’ of a norm, between coordination and
regulation.170 The RCRC model seeks to capture the particular tension inherent to norm
generating processes where the nature of the particular issue does not easily lend itself to an
association with only one of these elements. The evolving norms and the processes of their
generation in sensitive regulatory areas defy a categorization of either public or private,
coordinative or regulative. As a result, their classification as either ‘law’ or ‘non‐law’ depending
on their origin in a recognized, competent law‐making authority is as problematic as is the
declaration that a norm constitutes a merely ‘private’ arrangement or, ‘social norm’. RCRC,
thus, problematizes the tension between the definition of a norm’s legitimacy as law or non‐
law with reference to whether or not it emanated from an ‘official’ law‐making authority on the
one hand and as to whether the legitimacy of norms should be measured in light of the input
into their creation by those ‘affected’ by the norm, on the other. As we have tried to show with
regard to a number of fast‐evolving regulatory areas in both contract and corporate law, the
particular dynamics of norm‐creation in sensitive societal areas characterized by a hybrid
169
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combination of official and inofficial actors and a high degree of experimental, tentative,
reflexive regulation, suggest the impossibility to associate such processes with only one of the
identified sides.
From this perspective, the transnational regulatory landscape of corporate governance is
marked by the intricate collision of public, private and hybrid, ceaselessly evolving norm making
processes that arise between regulatory arenas populated by actors inside and outside of the
nation state. These norm making processes are complex in the sense that the identification of
either coordinative (facilitating) or regulatory (redistributing) functions can no longer occur on
the basis of distinguising between the public or private nature of the actors involved. Instead,
the norm making processes have to be seen as law generating when and where we are willing
to recognize the inseparability of the coordinative/regulatory dimension from the
authority/affectedness dimension of these processes.
Against this background, what can be learned from this example for other contemporary forms
of law making? Recognizing a growing interest among legal scholars in the origins and prospects
of what is conventionally referred to as a ‘privatisation of law’171, it is necessary to emphasize
that the regulatory function of the Code does not follow from the state’s enactment of a
statutory disclosure obligation, as was repeatedly argued by those identifying the Code as a
public regulatory instrument. What constitutes an unsatisfactory answer to the question
whether or not the Code is law, resulted from the recognition that in fact not only the
underlying drafting process but also the envisioned enforcement mechanism are intriguingly
complex and arguably open‐ended for a reason. The government did not make the Code
directly or indirectly enforceable, when it enacted the disclosure requirement, as it did not
itself enact an ultimately effective sanctioning mechanism for the case of non‐disclosure or
deficient disclosure. Instead, the government’s action in this regard illustrates a particular set of
features that characterize law making in the area of corporate governance and many other
regulatory areas today. The Code can only fulfil its function of influencing corporate behavior
and, as such, rendering German corporations more competitive, if a sufficient number of
market participants endorse the Code’s rules to make them matter. In that sense, a rough
consensus regarding the Code’s normative obligations must exist for it to have any influence on
the corporate landscape. This rough consensus must not encompass each and every of the
Code’s recommendations or, perhaps even lesser, its suggestions. Instead, it suffices that there
is among market participants a far reaching agreement – a rough consensus – as to the binding
quality of the Code’s content. That this is the case, has been verified by a number of empirical
studies since its publication.172 Secondly, the particular quality of the Code’s three‐pronged
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regulatory nature of information (restatements), recommendations and suggestions in
connection with the statutory disclosure requirements for recommendations leads to a
complex constellation of the Code’s regulatory impact. Where a rough consensus is being
attained, it might set into motion the generation and crystallisation of a customary law of
corporate governance norms, namely with the passage of time and an increasing acceptance of
the Code among market participants. With the crystallisation of certain corporate governance
rules, parts of the law of corporate governance can develop into a regime which can further
develop and solidify in the future. In light of such an incremental growth of norms through
piloting (drafting a code), implementing (publishing it) and enforcing them (through a
communication obligation set by the state on the one hand, and a market shaming process on
the other), the Code can contribute to the growth of a corporate governance regime, which can
become ever more comprehensive, while at the same time being more flexible, open and
adaptive to changes than a statutory provision would be.
Seen in this light, the Code is illustrative of how recommendations can be made to enter a
regulatory realm, which is occupied by both public and private norm‐entrepreneurs, including
the state that is pursuing corporate law reform, and private actors such as banks, investments
funds and expert groups who are calling for new rules governing corporate conduct but also
other stakeholders such as unions and business ethics propagators. From this perspective, the
Code denotes how recommendations can increasingly be recognised as ‘rules to be followed’,
long before they may grow into widely accepted norms of ‘good governance’. That the latter is
not oriented towards a reductionist concept of market efficiency, is maintained by connecting
the coordinative/regulatory dimension with that of authority/affectedness. It is against this
background, then, that we need to not only return again to the original question of whether the
Code is law, but also to dare asking whether we have been asking the right question.
As suggested, the perspective taken vis‐à‐vis reform issues related to corporate governance has
been informed by both a public‐private, official‐non‐official distinction between law and non‐
law on the one hand and a deeply felt skepticism about the chances for the law reform of
historically grown, path‐dependent norms and institutions, not only in ‘Germany
Incorporated’173, on the other. And, indeed, the legacies with which we have been struggling,
are weighty. In contrast to the the institutional and methodological side of norm setting and
law making in the context of increasingly ‘privatised’ law making forms, most contemporary
commentators of corporate law reform have not yet begun to embrace such a perspective. As it
stands, law reform continues to be conceptualised largely with regard to a dualistic perception
of state regulation and ‘intervention’ on the one hand and market order and self‐regulation on
the other. Traditionally, the German choice was thus: ‘To regulate or not to regulate’. And, the
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traditional answer was, indeed, to regulate.174 The realm of options for the protection of
shareholders’ interests have thus been perceived to range from coercive, binding law (‘vested
rights’) to an approach of entrusting this protection to the capital market. In the latter extreme,
the shareholder’s position as that of a rightsholder in a corporation would basically be seen as a
tradable asset, the value of which would be determined by the market, not by ‘the law’.175
There is, certainly, much more to be said to this set of alternatives, and the dramatic
substitution of post‐Enron corporate governance reform176 by an overwhelming task to come to
terms with the current financial and economic crisis underscores the dimensions of the task
faced.
But it is against this background that ‐ on both sides of the Atlantic ‐ the search for ‘good
governance’ in company law will continue. It will do so by involving the wide range of public,
private and hybrid law making forms which we have increasingly grown accustomed to. For this,
valuable lessons can be drawn from earlier examples of commercial self‐regulation (e.g.
standard contracts), as well as from other, contemporary developments in other fields
(environmental law, commercial arbitration177). The rich spectrum of experiences on the
national, European and international level is reflective of an on‐going search for ways to
adequately mobilise societal knowledge while being aware and conscious of divergent national
trajectories of socio‐legal and economic development. The enactment of the Corporate
Governance Code and the installation and indeed highly effective continuation of a ‘standing
commission’ to review its acceptance and the need of amendments are both illustrations of a
change in approaching law reform in a politically highly contested area. At the same time, the
development of codes, in Germany as in many other countries around the world, by private and
174
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public actors, both domestically and transnationally, gives testimony of an emerging legal
regime that can no longer adequately be relegated to either a state or market realm. Instead,
the emerging regime of a transnational law of corporate governance is characterised by its
‘spatial’ character, both with regard to its normative scope and its institutional origin.
As corporate governance scholarship continues to sharpen its lens for deeper structures of
formal/informal norm‐creation and the particular socio‐economic cultures178 in which different
hybrid regulatory approaches emerge, it becomes evident to which degree ‘comparative
corporate governance’179 is being transformed into a inter‐disciplinary area of regulatory
analysis. Our focus on the way in which corporate governance principles are migrating in
between different national political economies on the one hand and emerging, constantly
reshaping regulatory spaces, for which Marc Amstutz has poignantly used the term of
‘interlegality’180, on the other, informs and accentuates our perceptions not only for the
existing differences in national corporate laws, but more importantly for the fact that
conventionally viewed ‘national corporate governance systems’ have long become
transnationally constituted spaces of institutional and normative interaction and contestation.
They are, thus, anything than peaceful, embedded legal orders. Instead, they are marked by a
fundamental regulatory transformation in which social norms and ‘soft law’ become
intertwined, changed, adapted and interwoven within a regulatory environment which itself is
no longer stable.
The case of corporate governance reform, which we studied in this paper, illustrates the degree
to which the contested issues and the successively made proposals that grew out of a far‐
reaching and open‐eyed gathering of information and evidence by national and supra‐national
policy makers, expert committees and scholars were of a veritable transnational nature,
emerging from parallel reform efforts in other countries, among private and non‐state actors
around the world. In that sense181, domestic company law reform must be seen as part of an
emerging transnational legal pluralism. Its defining feature is the fundamental contestation of
the very distinction that legal pluralism has always struggled with: that between law and non‐
law.

178

See only Amir N. Licht, 'The Mother of all Path‐Dependencies: Towards a Cross‐Cultural Theory of Corporate
Governance Systems' (2001) 26 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 147.

179

Mark J. Roe, 'Comparative corporate governance' in P Newman (ed) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998)

180

Marc Amstutz, 'In‐Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning' (2005) 11
European Law Journal 766; see also Marc Amstutz and Vagias Karavas, 'Rechtsmutation: Zu Genese und Evolution
des Rechts im transnationalen Raum' (2006) Rechtshistorisches Journal 14.
181

Referring to examples of transnational human rights litigation, see hereto Robert Wai, 'Transnational Private
Law and Private Ordering in Contested Global Society' (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 471, 475‐476.

2010]

NEITHER PUBLIC NOR PRIVATE, NATIONAL NOR TRANSNATIONAL

43

V. CONCLUSION
Corporate governance norms provide a telling example of the transformation of traditional
state‐originating, official norm‐setting in favour of increasingly de‐centralised, multi‐level
processes of norm production. At the same time, not only are norms produced on more levels;
the nature of these norms themselves changes dramatically. What the foregoing assessment of
the present trajectories of transnational corporate governance (including the case study of
Germany’s efforts as regards corporate governance reform) illuminated is the particular nature
of the regulation of business conduct and corporations in globally interdependent activity
spheres (marketisation), fundamentally changing national political economies (privatisation)
and a dramatic expansion of issue‐driven, functionalist regulatory regimes (scientisation).182
This constellation, however, suggests nothing less than a fundamental contestation and erosion
of boundaries between state and non‐state actors, between official and unofficial law, between
public and private ordering.183 What is important at this point is to repeat the observation
made earlier, that the novelty of this blurring of boundaries between traditional norm‐creating
and –executing spheres appears as a direct result of a specific historical experience of a
particular framework of socio‐economic, political‐legal regulation that characterised the 20th
rise of the Social and Welfare State.184 This experience has been aptly identified and
premeditated by turn‐of‐the‐century sociologists and lawyers, and powerfully captured by Max
Weber’s sobering assessment of the disenchantment of modernity.185 Irredeemably thrown
into the iron cage of modern rationalisation186, contemporary hopes are pinned – if at all – on a
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transformative realisation of emerging self‐regulatory potentials.187 It is against this narrative,
that I see current attempts to rethink legal regulation as ‘regulatory governance’, ‘regulatory
capitalism’, or ‘rough consensus and running code’.
The framework of transnational corporate governance regulation can only be understood
against the background and in light of the complex, intertwined nature of corporate
governance regulation as it unfolds in a context marked by tensions between national and, for
example, European aspirations for market competitiveness, market and polity integration
dynamics and the increasingly transnational nature of firm’s operations and regulations. A
viable theory of transnational law making must seek to acknowledge these contextual tensions
and acknowledge the various learning experiences with regard to market regulation in order to
productively integrate them into an enriched concept of regulatory governance. Such a theory
might then be able to capture the particular dynamics of transnational corporate governance
regulation through its structuring capacities of distinguishing between the substantive and
procedural dimensions of contemporary norm‐creation. The particular promise of a theory such
as RCRC here lies in its capacity to draw conceptual lines between the experimentation with
norm‐creating processes, which are understood as contextualised learning processes (‘rough
consensus’) on the one hand, and the assessment of emerging normative bodies on the other
(‘running code’). The promise of RCRC lies in its sensitivity with regard to knowledge emanating
from concrete regulatory contexts that are recognized as norm proposals. Within the process of
disseminating such norm proposals, they are gradually evolving into programs of regulation.
Emerging into a still evolving running code, such norm programs remain fully assessable from
any factual or normative standpoint, while not sacrificing their ongoing regulatory function. As
such, this model strives – not unlike competing governance concepts – for coherence,
applicability and, ultimately, legitimacy.
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